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Abstract: In his adaptation of Robinson Crusoe, Campe sets out to examine the legitimacy of his
contemporary social reality (in Europe in the broadest sense) by tracing its origin back to the most basic
roots conceivable. The experimental character of his book is emphasised and—to an extent—explicitly
introduced through the frame narrative which constitutes Campe’s most important addition to
Defoe’s story: Here the emergence of the rules and routines are extensively mooted by the father
(who relates Robinson’s story as a framed narrative) and his children who still have to internalise,
grasp, and situate the moral rules around them and frequently offer divergent perspectives in the
process. The frame narrative connects the moral “ontogeny” of the children to the “phylogenetics” of
civilisation and suggests that both can be superimposed on one another. I will work with concepts
that focus on the differentiation between “innate” moral characteristics and their social transformation
on a cognitive, evolutionary level, from which Campe clearly deviates. However, his short-circuiting
of the individual and the phylogeny leads to very similar specifications as laid out by, for instance,
Moral Foundations Theory.
Keywords: Johann Heinrich Campe; Robinson Crusoe; Moral Foundations Theory
1. Introduction
“Was mich so in die Welt hinausgetrieben?—Will ich aufrichtig sein, so war der, der den ersten
Anstoß dazu gab, ein alter Bekannter von uns Allen, und zwar Niemand anders als Robinson
Crusoe.” ([1], p. 244).1
With this succinct statement, Friedrich Gerstäcker, the famous German traveler and novelist,
captured the profound and lasting impact that Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe had made ever
since its publication in 1719. Sixty years later, one of the most influential texts in the eighteenth
century saw yet another re-iteration of its plot: The enlightened pedagogue Joachim Heinrich Campe
wrote an adaptation for the “pleasant and useful entertainment of children” [2], following the
purpose Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggested for Defoe’s novel in his treatise Émile. This distinctly
didactic overtone combined with the exotic elements of the story provide an insight into the specific
“Germanization” of Robinson’s fate [3]. Considered a veritable “bible for the bourgeois” [4], the novel
indeed breaks down various ethical scenarios and rules, pertaining to both the moral entwinement
with others and the “good life” as an ethical objective. The rules that materialise in the book at
first seem predictable (especially in the heyday of Enlightenment); moreover, its foreign backdrop
1 “What drove me into the world? If I am to be honest, it was an old acquaintance that first initiated it, namely none other
than Robinson Crusoe.” My translation.
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is tightly connected to the conventional colonial discourse patterns of the time. However, on closer
inspection the novel proves to be more complex than anticipated, as the second part of this article
seeks to demonstrate: That, of course, does not change the fundamentally colonial slant of Campe’s
argument, but it demonstrates how authors at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the
nineteenth centuries found multi-faceted answers to the challenges of colonial expansion in the age of
Enlightenment.2
Robinsonades are often categorised as a sub-genre of the utopian novel. Johann Gottfried
Schnabel’s novel Insel Felsenburg [6] (The Island Stronghold, 1731–1743) offers a prime example of this
classification, as the fourpartite novel combines shipwreck, insular isolation, and the conceptualisation
of a utopian community far away from the war-ridden Europe of the eighteenth century. The Island
Stronghold—at least in its first installment—presents a proper incarnation of the classic Utopia motif.
The original Robinsonade, Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, focuses on the new beginning for the protagonist,
primarily in terms of his introspection, his conversion to Christianity and the rebuilding of civisalisation
(by means of tools and technical devices), in a constant fight against the forces of nature. Not only the
conquest of nature, but also the conquest of self and the scale of human achievement have been read
as utopian elements.
What has Campe’s adaptation to offer beyond these ideas, which were routinely explored
throughout the long eighteenth century, not least in Defoe’s seminal novel? Campe himself found
the material Defoe presented auspicious but objected to the dry delivery of the story. At first sight,
the alterations Campe implemented seem geared toward making it more palatable to children for
whom he foresaw the greatest pedagogical benefits. On closer inspection, his changes prove to have
a far-reaching impact on the underlying argument. If read as (partially) utopian (or, by the same
token, dystopian in certain respects), Defoe’s text already interconnects personal growth with spatial
isolation—in this sense it seems to anticipate aspects of a “temporal utopia” (as described by Reinhart
Koselleck in reference to Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s L’an 2440). Campe’s appropriation of Crusoe brings
out this aspect and fully aligns it with the idea of Bildung in the late eighteenth century ([3], p. 105).
By means of an extensive frame narrative, in which the story is told and discussed with children,
this pedagogical, evolutionary dimension comes to the fore. In view of the constant reflection and
interpretation performed by the family and the children, Robinson’s story presents less of an alternative
reality and more of an illuminating experiment which doubles as a commentary on their coeval society.
With a particular focus on Wezel’s Robinson Crusoe and Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahren (1821, 1829)
as a new type of literature, Torsten Hahn and Nicolas Pethes have argued that the idea of an open-ended
experiment filled the void that providence had left [7]. Politically speaking, an “experiment” allowed
for the notion of social governance to persist while also acknowledging a basic contingency of life.
In clear contrast with these novels, the emerging social parameters in Robinson the Younger strike us as
familiar as they resonate with the order in place in Europe. Furthermore providence is still an explicit
and dominant concept in Campe’s novel, although it mainly seems to be part of the overarching
pedagogical message of Bildung and self-mastery: fearfulness is exposed and condemned as the main
motivational source that is most likely to interfere with the principal notion of reason in the novel.3
Just as in Wezel’s and Goethe’s novels, the professed uncertainty of the outcome is crucial for the
ideological undertone of Campe’s book and for what I claim to be its experimental character.4 Campe
sets out to examine the legitimacy of his contemporary social reality (in Europe in the broadest sense)
by tracing its origins back to the most basic roots conceivable. Apparently he does not take the state of
2 In the late eighteenth century, new scientific approaches were often tied to these challenges, such as the budding discipline
of anthropology and its integral assumption of a “unified, trans-temporal category of the human” ([5], p. 326).
3 Robinson succeeds in mastering his fear and finds his unshakeable trust in God, which in turn provides him with equanimity
required to cope with dangerous situation.
4 Hahn and Pethes point out that the notion of an experiment is a fundamental element of utopias in any case ([7], p. 128).
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things per se for the best of all possible worlds: However, in his thought experiment it might emerge as
such after a profound logical examination of its workings.
In the following I seek to show how Campe’s commentary is both highly affirmative and at the
same time radically challenging in its intercultural outlook and its analysis of society. He dwells on
processes of valuation themselves, thus, almost implicitly, tackling the premises of individual and
collective moral engagement with the respective environment. While the ‘formation of the German
colonizer’ ([3], p. 106) is indubitably crucial for the novel, the emphasis of my article lies exactly on
Campe’s attempt to focus on the activity of valuing which will here be understood and explored within
the context of new cognitive research on issues of morality.
Campe’s young Robinson has to grapple with two sets of values: one that is preordained
by his Christian God, who is omnipresent in the novel, and another that actually emerges as the
result of certain relational patterns of organism-environment interaction. This difference is vital.
Campe’s careful analysis of the human psyche differentiates between unchangeable constitutents and
malleable components, which are the result of upbringing and education. It is this distinct focus on
perfectibility—topical in the eighteenth century—which transforms the utopian notion of virtuous
self-fashioning into an experiment. What Campe holistically conjures up is a zero hour in which
the protagonist loses all the privileges of civilisation. While Defoe’s Crusoe is able to salvage goods
from the shipwreck, Robinson the Younger is marooned on the shores of a remote island without
any possessions, let alone pets. All the same he manages to establish a routine, constructs tools
and progresses through different technological stages to relative luxury and comfort. In view of
Robinson’s emerging daily routine Campe’s narrative indeed converges with utopian concepts, as he
develops a timeless blueprint for a “good life” (in an ethical sense) which proves straightforwardly
transferable to eighteenth-century Germany. By establishing the new order on the island based on no
other presupposition than its congruence with (human) nature and common sense Campe’s novel
follows an essential rule of utopian fiction. However, since the order on the island—again, derived
from nature and extrapolated from reason—coincides with a significant number of laws, premises,
rules and ideas of eighteenth-century Europe, as the father in the frame narrative is keen to emphasise,
the outcome of the insular experiment broadly affirms the Western order that is in force. In this respect,
Campe’s Robinson—despite its proximity to utopian literature—clearly deviates from this genre.
The experimental character is emphasised and—to an extent—explicitly introduced through
the frame narrative which constitutes Campe’s most important addition to Defoe’s story: here the
emergence of the rules and routines are extensively mooted by the father (who relates Robinson’s
story as a framed narrative) and his children who still have to internalise, grasp, and situate
the moral rules around them and therefore frequently offer divergent perspectives in the process.
Although the outcome of the discussion is often predictable, the conversation is genuinely open-ended
and dependent on an ostensibly judicious, unbiased exploration of the problem in question,
thus duplicating the scrutiny (and problematic confirmation) of the Western social order in the
framed narrative. Like Rousseau before, Campe follows the line of eighteenth-century conjectural,
philosophical history with its “thrust [...] toward a more systematic treatment of the social” and
presents his case study as moral science ([8], p. 171). The development of civilisation unfolds around
Robinson’s shipwreck, a virtual resetting event ([9], p. 19), which starts the process of civilisation
afresh. Vice versa, the moral progression of the children is facilitated by the proper comprehension of
this very phylogeny.
The frame narrative thus connects the moral “ontogeny” of the children with the “phylogenetics”
of civilisation and suggests that both can be superimposed on one another, as they both follow the
same explainable and logical rules. I am using these technical terms in inverted commas here, as they
only conceptually resemble the biological terms. In the following I will work with concepts that focus
on the differentiation between “innate” moral characteristics and their social transformation on a
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cognitive, evolutionary level, from which Campe clearly deviates.5 However, his short-circuiting of the
individual and the phylogenetic moral development leads to very similar specifications with regard
to stability and change as laid out recently by “Moral Foundations Theory” [10], with which a group
of social and cultural psychologists attempts to explain the origins of and variation in human moral
reasoning on the basis of innate, modular foundations.
Highlighting this more elusive aspect by accentuating the above mentioned developmental
perspective only means to bring out the ambivalence in Campe’s novel more clearly: he heavily
draws on characteristic colonial discourse patterns and topoi (savage, primitive, superstitious,
illiterate, apolitical, child-like, etc. [11], p. 32), as Susanne Zantop has comprehensively shown [3]:
Campe may admittedly foreground a dynamic concept of culture based on pedagogically guided
transformation and change (which is distinctly German/European); he conceives of this process as
strictly asymmetrical nonetheless. While the idea of a young German marooned on a remote island,
who forges a friendship with the natives, seems to speak to the potential of transcultural hybridity, the
novel concerns itself rather with basic processes of valuing which are unmistakably intended to justify
the European order in place—just as the above mentioned experiment sets out to demonstrate. Thus the
sphere on the island that opens up as an intercultural encounter zone cannot be perceived as reciprocal:
only in view of peripheral aspects—for instance when it comes to merely technical know-how (Friday
teaches Robinson how to ignite a fire)—Campe acknowledges a transcultural flow, i.e., he concedes
valuable knowledge (rendered unnecessary by the course the civilisation in Europe) to Friday, who
is otherwise evidently the main recipient of worthwhile cultural input. While the novel defies the
notion of transcultural hybridity proper (Friday is just transformed into a young European man), it still
recognises the above-mentioned processual dimension of culture as civilisation—admittedly with a
teleological bent. According to Campe’s conventional narrative these different timelines of progress
are ostensibly bound to culminate in enlightened Europe.
At the same time, Campe offers a very basic notion of human equality hidden beneath the layers of
hierarchised cultural diversity: as I will demonstrate, this underlying idea of human equality helps to
disabuse the children in the frame narrative from preconceived notions of superiority and encourages
them to assess and evaluate moral actions within their original, culturally determined context. With
these two different perspectives in place, Campe can highlight the—in his view—unquestionable
dominance of Europe, whilst simultaneously embracing the inherent logic of other cultural orders:
although the colonial discourse is the dominant tone in this novel, I will focus on this latter aspect in
the following and argue that Campe is amenable to it, as he is able to identify basic and universally
binding, meta-cultural core values (such as moral accounting and reciprocity), connecting humankind
across all geographical and temporal barriers.
Ultimately, of course, these notions of diversity are the result of the (still) expanding colonial
horizons of the eighteenth century, as the appreciation for different ‘histories‘ (as in Johann Gottfried
Herder’s historism) had to be squared with the increasingly central idea of progress ([12], pp. 375–78).
The transformative quality of this perspective indeed constitutes a subliminal, transcultural dimension
of Campe’s argument.6
2. History on a Small Scale
Based on the learning scenario in the frame narrative, Campe’s novel—like its precursor Robinson
Crusoe—contains many historically specific references that proceed from the parameters of European
5 With his notion of deep history Daniel Lord Smail problematises this concept by drawing attention to a problem connected
with the premises of conjectural history: “Conjectural historians, concerned with the process, did not trouble themselves
with origins. To make their schemes work, all they needed was a set of primitive or presocial conditions.” ([9], p. 21).
6 In this sense, his argument resonates with central “fantasies of political origin” as for instance in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.
Hobbes refers to the “savages” in America who still find themselves in the state of nature. Philip Manow elaborates on this
“phylogenetic” perspective ([13], pp. 21–34).
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law and morality, in particular natural law. As we know, Robinson’s solitary existence eventually ends
when he comes across indigenous people, saves and eventually befriends Friday. His encounter with
Friday shows how the rights of the superior come into being. On entering Robinson’s abode, Friday is
duly impressed with the various products emanating from Robinson’s incessant work:
“Hier machte der Wilde große Augen, da er die bequeme und ordentliche Einrichtung der
Wohnung seines Erretters sahe, weil er so was schönes in seinem ganzen Leben noch nicht gesehen
hatte. Es war ihm ohngefähr eben so dabei zu Muthe, als wenn ein Landman, der nie aus seinem Dorfe
gekommen ist, zum erstenmahle in einen Pallast geführt wird.” ([2], p. 203).7
Friday’s wonder again throws into sharp relief the fact that Campe—following Defoe’s
material8—is actually retelling the story of civilisation. In view of Robinson’s conspicuous excellence
in all areas, Friday has no choice but to submit himself voluntarily to Robinson, especially, and I will
return to this, as he owes him his life:
“Freitag (denn so wollen wir ihn nun künftig auch nennen) näherte sich ihm mit allen ersinlichen
Zeichen der Ehrerbietung und der Dankbarkeit, kniete alsdan vor ihm nieder, legte seinen Kopf
abermahls plat auf die Erde, und sezte eben so, wie er es das erstemahl gemacht hatte, seines Befreiers
Fuß auf seinen Nakken. [...Robinson] gab ihm also durch Zeichen und Gebehrden zu verstehen, daß er
ihn zwar in seinen Schuz genommen habe, aber nur unter der Bedingung eines strengen Gehorsams:
daß er sich also müsse gefallen lassen, alles das zu thun oder zu lassen, was er, sein Herr und König
ihm zu befehlen oder zu verbieten für gut erachten wurde. Er bediente sich dabei des Worts Katschike,
womit die wilden Amerikaner ihre Oberhäupter zu benennen pflegen, wie er sich glüklicher Weise
erinnerte, einmahl gehört zu haben. Mehr durch dieses Wort, als durch die damit verbundenen
Zeichen, verstand Freitag die Meinung seines Herrn und äusserte seine Zufriedenheit darüber, indem
er das Wort Katschike einige mahl mit lauter Stimme widerholte, dabei auf Robinson wies und sich von
neuem ihm zu Füßen warf. Ja, um zu zeigen, daß er recht gut wisse, was es mit der königlichen Gewalt
zu bedeuten habe, ergrif er den Spieß, gab ihn seinem Herrn in die Hand, und sezte die Spize desselben
sich selbst auf die Brust, vermuthlich um dadurch anzuzeigen, daß er mit Leib und Leben in seiner
Macht stehe. Robinson reichte ihm hierauf mit der Würde eines Monarchen freundlich die Hand zum
Zeichen seiner königlichen Huld, und befahl ihm abermahls, sich zu lagern, um die Abendmahlzeit
mit ihm einzunehmen. [...] Seht, Kinder, auf diese oder auf eine ähnliche Weise sind die ersten Könige
in der Welt entstanden. Es waren Männer, die an Weisheit, an Muth und an Leibesstärke andern
Menschen überlegen waren. Daher kamen diese zu ihnen, um sie zu bitten, sie gegen wilde Thiere,
deren es anfangs mehr gab, als jezt, und gegen solche Menschen zu beschüzen, die ihnen Unrecht thun
wolten.—Dafür versprachen sie dan, ihnen in allen Stükken gehorsam zu sein, und ihnen von ihren
Heerden und von ihren Früchten jährlich etwas abzugeben, damit sie selbst nicht nöthig hätten, sich
ihren Unterhalt zu erwerben, sondern sich ganz allein mit der Sorge für ihre Unterthanen beschäftigen
könten.” ([2], pp. 206–7)9.
7 “Here the savage stared, to see the convenient and regular disposition of his deliverer’s habitation, because he had never
seen any thing so handsome in his life. He was nearly in the same frame of mind, as a country man, who has never been
away from his village, when he sees a palace for the first time.” ([14], p. 58).
8 Johann Karl Wezel, who published his adaptation of Robinson Crusoe in 1779, highlighted this aspect in Defoe’s novel,
when he explicitly stated that Robinson describes—if presented appropriately—human history on a small scale, a miniature
painting of different states humankind had successively gone through ([15], p. XVII). Campe’s and Wezel’s rather different
adaptations appear at almost the same time; cf. for the ensuing controversy and further context [16].
9 “Friday (for so we will call him for the future) drew near with all possible marks of respect and gratitude, then kneeled
down before him, laid his head flat on the ground and placed his deliverer’s foot on the neck, as he had done the first time.
[...Robinson] gave him therefore to understand by signs and gestures, that he had indeed taken him under his protection,
but only on condition of the strictest obedience: that he must therefore consent to door not to do, whatever he, his Lord
and King should think proper to order or forbid him. In making him understand this, he made use of the word Katschike,
a name, by which the Americans call their superious, which he luckily remember’d to have heard once. This word made
Friday understand the meaning of his master, more than all the signs with which he accompanied it, and he expressed his
satisfaction by repeating the word Katschike several times with a loud voice and by prostrasting himself again at his feet.
Nay, to convince him that he knew very well, what royal authority was, he took hold of the lance, put it into his master’s
hands, and placed the point of it on his breast, probably to indicate, that his body and life were in his power. Hereupon
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It is worth quoting this extensive passage, since it not only touches on a plethora of colonial
stereotypes, but is as much a historical explanation as a reference to contractarianism—a veritable
“social contract” which will be brought into play in its proper legal form at the end of the novel,
when Robinson, figuratively speaking, passes on the sceptre to his fellow islanders (at that point, the
governmental system is already in place, fully adapted to human strengths and weaknesses).
This scene evokes an archaic political ritual, bearing out the explicit claim that power relations
came into being as a logical and natural consequence of physical and/or intellectual superiority.
Following this premise of natural law, the episode prior to this alliance also complies with
eighteenth-century moral requirements. As Robinson shies away from killing an enemy to protect his
life in the long run (Friday, untouched by civilisation as it were, has to step in and slay the native, which
he incidentally does without any hesitation), the scene dispels any suspicion that Campe’s Robinson
might act out of self-interest.10 Robinson’s impeccable actions and motivations prove instrumental
in Campe’s attempt to show rather than to postulate the realisation of legitimate power hierarchies.
By the same token, these scenarios supply the reader with a logical, reasonable justification of power.
What follows is the quasi-enthronement of Robinson as the island monarch in whose jocular
description the father and the children revel: “Robinson war also nunmehr ein wirklicher König, nur
daß seine Herschaft sich nicht weiter, als über einen einzigen Unterthan und einige Lamas erstrekte;
den Papagai mit einbegriffen.”11 ([2], p. 207).
Strikingly, these two young men—later portrayed as brothers, i.e., as family—are very clearly
conceptualised as ruler and subject on the island. Thus the European understanding of order is
seamlessly imposed on them; the children in the frame narrative laugh at this as expected, however,
the whole etiology determines that Campe indeed associates the beginning of civilisation proper with
concepts of legitimate, “reasonable” power hierarchies. Replaying this historical genesis on an island
in the sixteenth century—this is how the father dates the events on the island—lends it an air of
teleology where “history” naturally culminates in Western civilisation.12 In so doing, Campe allows
for different strands of history, but he is also keen to highlight the European superiority which he
again not so much postulates but quasi scientifically establishes by dint of Robinson’s life on the island:
the young castaway has to re-invent it from scratch, guided only by reason, necessity and a “natural”
morality—all of these latter aspects belong to the experimental arrangement of the novel.
Campe also repeatedly emphasises Friday’s childlikeness,13 projecting the concept of family
bonds onto the political realm in a way that was not uncommon in eighteenth-century Germany
(especially in the reference to the Landesvater). The novel occasionally recognises that Friday might
be better adapted to the life on the island, but it also clarifies that his mind (Verstand) is still less
developed. In this sense, Robinson indeed serves as a well-meaning patriarch who loves, protects, and
ROBINSON kindly reached him his hand with the dignity of a monarch as a sign of his royal favour, and order’d him again
to sit down, and take his supper with him. [...] Look ye, my children, the first kings in the world took their rise in this
and the like manner. They were men, who surpast others in wisdom, courage and bodily strength. Therefore they came to
them and begged their protection against wild beasts, of which there were anciently more than at present, and against such
people as would wrong them.—For this they promised to obey them in every thing and to give them every year something
of their flocks and fruit, that they might not be in the necessity of getting their own livelihood, but employ themselves solely
with the care of their subjects.” ([14], pp. 62–64).
10 Campe’s effort to clarify the scenario morally becomes tangible in comparison with Wezel’s Robinson in which Robinson
pursues the natives intentionally to satisfy his need for a companion: “Er wollte den Wilden auflauern, sie anfallen und ein
Schlachtopfer ihrer Grausamkeit erlösen, damit der Errettete aus Dankbarkeit sein Freund würde und ihm den Weg nach dem festen
Lande zeigte. [...] Man merkt, daß ihm die Leidenschaft diesen Grund eingab, denn er ist falsch.” “He wanted to ambush the
savages and save a victim from their cruelty, so that the saved victim would become his friend out of gratitude and would
show him the way to the mainland. [...] One realises that passion inspired him to think of this as the reason for it is false.”
My translation.
11 “Robinson was now a real king, only that his dominion reached no further, than over a single subject and some lama’s, the
parrot included.” ([14], p. 64).
12 This is obviously connected to the colonial discourse in Germany into which I cannot delve here, cf. ([17], pp. 19–21, 74–80).
13 This take again differs from Wezel, who extensively dwells on Franz’ (who is the equivalent of Friday in this text) animal-like
qualities, when he describes how Franz follows his master like a dog ([15], p. 195).
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educates his subjects. The notion of the non-European as a “child” is a familiar trope in postcolonial
discourse of course, however, in Campe’s novel it serves another function as well: I will return to
this notion of family as a master trope of power later; for now it remains notable that childhood is
perceived as a form of immaturity that the adolescent is required (and, if taught and educated properly,
bound) to overcome. In this sense the relation between Robinson and Friday is also determined by a
temporal aspect (not in terms of their biological age, but rather their cultural stage) and supposed to
balance itself out in the long run. As this trope is also famously an intercultural one, it ties together
the “phylogeny” of mankind with the individual “ontogeny” which is insouciantly projected onto the
status quo: The world presents itself to Robinson (and to the audience in the frame narrative 200 years
later) as segmented into different historical-temporal layers, focussing on nations and ethnicities that
find themselves at varying developmental stages. Automatically, the novel inculcates the reader with
the importance of the Western world, as it defines the teleological endpoint of the journey on which
Friday both studiously and successfully embarks. According to the text, the synchronisation of these
different stages is conceivable (at least for young Friday, his father Thursday dies before they embark
the ship to Europe) and can be achieved to a full extent, extinguishing almost all cultural differences.
3. Eighteenth-Century Law and Value Concepts
The discussions between the father and the children in the frame narrative extensively cover
legally specific questions ranging from self-defence to the jus litoris (which entitles Robinson to
take possession of the jetsam after the shipwreck). Vis-à-vis the notion of self-defence, the father
re-emphasises the foundation of natural law, but also refers to the rare necessity to resort to it in
Hamburg (viz. Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation):
“Allerdings, lieben Kinder, ist eine solche Nothwehr nach menschlichen und götlichen Gesezen
recht, aber wohl gemerkt!—nur in dem einzigen Fal, wenn ganz und gar kein anderes Mittel zu unserer
eigenen Rettung übrig ist. [...] Vergeßt nicht, lieben Kinder, Gott zu danken, daß wir in einem Lande
leben, in welchem die Obrigkeit so gute Veranstaltungen zu unserer Sicherheit getroffen hat, daß unter
hundert tausend Menschen höchst selten ein Einziger in die traurige Nothwendigkeit gerathen kan,
von dem Rechte der Nothwehr Gebrauch machen zu müssen.” ([2], pp. 201–2).14
The status quo is perceived as similarly exemplary with a view to “Wrecking”; Robinson, who is
the owner of the island, has an obvious right to appropriate the jetsam. This notion also derives from a
distinctly European context of property, which is presented as (ahistorical) common sense in the novel.
Robinson’s political power, prompting him to think of himself as a “proper king”, not only emanates
from what the novel understands as his intellectual and spiritual superiority, but also from a specific
conceptualisation of property: “Die ganze Insel war sein Eigenthum” ([2], p. 307). While he specifies
that the loyalty of his subjects originates in the fact that they all owe him their lives, the notion of the
island (that is also frequented by cannibals) as his property harks back to Locke’s extensive treatment
of the property question in the Second Treatise of Civil Government.15 The concept of self-ownership that
extends to the products of one’s labour permeates the entire novel and provides yet another layer of
justification for the power relations depicted in the novel. The acquisition of power is perceived as a
natural process that not only depends on innate superiority, but is also fundamentally connected with
14 “To be sure, my dear children, such self-defence is just according to divine and human laws, but—observe me well! In this
case only: when there is no other remedy so save ourselves. Whereas if we have an opportunity to escape, or to be protected
by others, or to disable our pursuers from hurting us: any attempt upon his life is real murder, and is punish’d as such by
the law. Don’t forget to thank God, my dear children, that we live in a country, in which our superiors have made such good
dispositions for our security, that scarce one man in a thousand can ever come in the melancholy necessity of fighting for his
own preservation.” ([14], p. 56).
15 “27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. [...]
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property.” [18].
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a humble work ethic (which Robinson decides to maintain even when he could delegate all work to
his subjects).16
Many of the concepts are historically specific to the onset of modernity in Europe and closely tied
to the discourses connected with it. However, as I said earlier, Campe’s originality lies in the specific
addition of the narrative frame, which focuses on the emergence, appropriation and production of
rules. The father and the children in the frame narrative are eager to explore the moral dimension
of every event that occurs: not only on the island, but also in the dialogues between grown-ups and
children we encounter a second and decisive zero hour narrative, as the children go through different
stages of evaluation when they are confronted with the various ethical dilemmas in their father’s story.
Again the insight the reader is supposed to gain from this is twofold: first, children prove to be adept
in common-sense (and thus confirm it as “natural”); second, where they seem more susceptible to
subjective perspectives led by personal preferences, the father forces them to probe and evaluate these
false assumptions and—as a result of this rational and reasonable scrutiny of all relevant facts and
premises—they prove happy to part with them. The conclusion they reach is thus in keeping with
their natural instinct where it is compatible with the intersubjective morality of the family and not
driven by unrationalised feelings.17
4. Individual and Collective Developmental History: Moral Foundations
In this sense, Campe’s Robinson the Younger not only concentrates on a miniature version of the
history of civilisation, but also explores the developmental aspect of moral standards.18 In view of
recent cognitive theories, Campe’s approach seems “modern” in this respect, as he conceptualises
morality as a form of “complex problem-solving—the reworking of a situation that has become
problematic and has inhibited our ability to skillfully, meaningfully, and harmoniously navigate our
social space”, drawing on a constellation of “human capacities and propensities for making sense of
our experience and engaging in problem-solving forms of inquiry.” ([20], p. 160).
Robinson does not find himself at a proper neutral point of course: he enters his adventure with a
primary understanding of values endorsed by his devout parents and transcendentally substantiated
by God. While everything related to human power is in need of an explanation and a reasonable
justification, Campe deems Christian morality an axiom for his exploration, as God holds unlimited
moral authority over people. It is striking nonetheless that Robinson’s relation to God is metaphorically
predicated on the notion of paternal guidance and protection, dovetailing with Campe’s approach
to power. Cognitive theories have engaged with the premises of morality by analysing its evolution
but also by searching for universal, quasi-biological (or biologically evolved) patterns. Although
the answers to these questions are still tentative, they conspicuously coincide with parts of Campe’s
analysis. Georg Lakoff’s and Mark Johnson’s thesis that virtually all our abstract moral concepts are
structured metaphorically is a long-established theory in the area of cognitive studies [21,22]. They
have not only suggested that conceptual metaphors are omnipresent in our quotidian life and shape
the way we think. Proceeding from the principal idea that the human mind is intrinsically embodied,
they have also introduced a ‘philosophy in the flesh’, concluding that “virtually all of our abstract
moral concepts are structured metaphorically.” ([22], p. 290). At the same time, they propose that
the range of metaphors relating to morality is limited, as basic moral metaphors are rooted in bodily
experience and social interactions: “We have found that the source domains of our metaphors for
morality are typically based on what people over history and across cultures have seen as contributing
to their well-being.” ([22], pp. 290–91).
16 This notion goes hand in hand with a specific take on nature. Cf. [19].
17 Cf. also Wezel’s above quoted, identical comment of the narrator: “Man merkt, daß ihm die Leidenschaft diesen Grund eingab,
denn er ist falsch.”
18 As such it differs from other adaptations of Defoe’s novel, as they lack the specific layout of Campe’s dialogical
frame narrative.
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Indeed when we examine the text more closely, we can see how Robinson’s realm is borne by
bodily projections (encapsulating above mentioned ideas of labour and property) which emanate from
various forms of bodily well-being: Robinson strives for (and achieves) security, safety, and comfort for
him and others, which is intricately interwoven with his ethical principles. All these categories relate
back to “basic possessions, bodily movement, and freedom from the infliction of pain” ([22], p. 329):
Campe’s Robinson aspires to the “freedom from the infliction of pain” accordingly—nature appears as
particularly threatening, and, as the protection mechanisms that civilisation has developed (shelter,
clothes, etc.) are unavailable to him at first, he has to recreate them. His remarkable trajectory begins
by reacquainting himself with basic necessities—aspiring to the absence of pain and harm, well-being,
physical intactness.
He experimentally formulates his life rules over the course of the novel, for instance when he
decides that he ought to maintain his daily routine borne by moderation and diligence, even though
Friday (as his “subject”) could relieve him of all physical labour.
Morever, the novel isolates two distinct principles of “moral accounting” which coincide
with the definition given by Lakoff and Johnson, who understand moral action as something
that gives “something of positive value” (i.e., to save Friday’s life, provide him with shelter and
food etc.) ([22], p. 293); vice versa, immoral action is something of negative value (i.e., eating enemies
without necessity). In addition to this first principle, the second principle adds that there is a moral
imperative to pay one’s debt and the failure to do so is in turn immoral (Friday’s unconditional loyalty
derives from this second principle).
The novel in fact introduces various forms of basic moral accounting schemes which extend
beyond Christian concepts. Although there are examples for altruism and forgiveness (i.e., when
the mutineers arrive on the island), the most common principle of moral accounting in the novel is
reciprocity in the sense of moral debt as it underpins the relationship between Robinson and Friday.
In so doing the novel attempts to develop ideas of power, rights, and duties as abstract
“second-order metaphorical concepts” from very concrete cases of debts and credits.
This brings us back to the above-mentioned moral initiation which Robinson has experienced
in his Christian family home. We can see how his Christian devotion is clearly modeled upon a
father-child relationship. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that morality might “be based on models
of family” and thus also connected to immediate, human experience. When Lakoff and Johnson
tentatively conclude: “To think of morality in general as some form of family morality requires another
metaphor, in which we understand all of humanity as part of one huge family which has traditionally
been called the ‘Family of Man’. This metaphor entails a moral obligation, binding on all people,
to treat each other as we ought to treat our family members.” ([22], p. 317).
Campe conforms with this statement as he indeed casts his protagonists in different roles that
conspicuously correspond with roles within a family. Friday might enter Robinson’s life as a subject
(i.e., as Robinson rules as a Landesvater, as a child), but, in the course of the novel, he evolves
and becomes his nominal brother. With this evolutionary dimension hierarchies can be devised
on a very basic notion of equality as human beings. Casting the “savages” as children not only
coincides with a specific colonial discourse pattern, it also chimes with core ideas of development
and perfectibilité. Enlightenment ideas about childhood and education follow a similar notion, when
they consider the immaturity (and thus inferiority) of children to be temporary.19 Both discourses
are intrinsically connected, as the European “ontogenetic” take on childhood provides the moral
blueprint for the colonial “phylogenetic” development: Campe’s frame narrative proves indispensable
for this perspective.
19 Cf., for instance, Karl Ludwig Pörschke: “Es findet zwischen Eltern und Kindern ebenso wenig als zwischen Bürgern
[Ungleichheit statt...], denn die Eltern befehlen dem Kind nur in seinem Namen das, was das Kind selbst sich bei voller
Vernunft befehlen würde.” [23]. “There is no inequality between parents and children, nor is there between citizens, for the
parents command their child only what the child would command herself if she were fully mature.” My translation.
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Friday becomes a paramount example of such developmental achievement, not without implying
a national superiority on Robinson’s part (owed to some sort of “phylogenetical” evolution as well,
which cannot fully be achieved by the people who join Western civilisation late). The asynchronicity
that Campe alludes to is both validating in general terms, as Campe is quite clear that even the
‘savages’ are fellow human beings, and condescending in a concrete respect, for instance, when the
father labels the “Wilden” as only “menschenähnliche” “Geschöpfen” ([2], p. 187),20 who resemble “wild
beasts” ([2], p. 188) given their brutish and “stupid” ([2], p. 187) upbringing. What the “savages”
need is proper education that builds on and fully develops their humanity: cannibalism derives
from ignorance ([2], pp. 225–26), but is nevertheless tied to ethical rules, as ‘only’ enemies are eaten.
Although this of course does not validate the abhorrent practice as such, the specification implies
that even ‘savages’ follow rules of moral accounting (enemies are paying their debt with their own
flesh) and are quite upset if accused that they would harm the innocent (who are debt free). Whilst
forming a fairly inclusive concept of humanity and drawing attention to these crucial nuances, Campe
offers a harsher view of their state of civilisation and confidently promotes his European ideas as
binding and fully-fledged. Thus, Campe’s Robinson affirms the civilised society in place, presenting
the bourgeois values implemented by Robinson as natural and perfectly adapted for survival,—even
and specifically—in competition with other modi vivendi. By dint of his “micro-history” of civilization
Campe is nonetheless forced to put European values up for discussion (even if they ultimately
re-emerge uncontested). The urge to perform an analysis of the origin of the power relation and the
question of its legitimacy is revealing as it indirectly formulates the need of justification in the first
place. Political theory was exploring these questions throughout the centuries—with special rigour
since the Renaissance—but Campe goes one step further and shows the inherently evolutionary quality
of the moral valuing processes (and thus their degree of changeability).21
Against this background, I will now investigate Campe’s reflections on ‘innate’ and taught
values. Robert McCauley has proposed a distinction between maturational naturalness and practiced
capacities. For him maturational naturalness describes natural cognition whose acquisition does not
depend on any form of explicit instruction, specifically structured learning environments, artifacts,
inputs that are particular to a culture or (even) on inputs that are culturally distinctive. Maturational
natural actions are undertaken spontaneously and a few of them feature general forms that are shared
by other species ([24], p. 29).
McCauley famously uses this specification to explore “why religion is natural and science is not”.
Maturationally natural capacities are in this sense theories with which humans are typically equipped
and which influence their implicit cognition. In his book Morality for Humans Mark Johnson extends
this definition to maturationally natural values which are of interest here. Johnson follows John Dewey
in the notion that valuing presents a more appropriate term than value, as it emphasises the dynamic
situation between organism and environment. He sees the preferential directness which aims for
certain states of organism-environment interaction as an evaluative process which can be “selectively
and abstractly described as that organism’s value, as long as we refrain from turning those ‘values’
into abstract entities.” ([20], p. 52).
With his specific adaptation of Defoe’s novel for children, Campe promotes both the relational,
interactive and the dynamic nature of valuing: we observe Robinson’s journey on which he not only
builds a material existence, but on which he also defines and expands on rules which are brought into
being as necessary; Campe might emphasise divine providence and reason specifically, however, what
bestows legitimacy on Robinson’s actions is the fact that they coincide with ‘values’ that are indeed
shared (or are potentially shareable) by everyone, even the ‘savages’. Only if Robinson meets this very
20 “Men; but no, only of such creatures, as have the mere shape of man” ([14], p. 36).
21 He not only suggests that a legitimate form of government has to be “natural” and comply with reason, but he also draws a
distinct line between nature and nurture, when he describes an underlying universal human understanding of morality,
displayed even by “savages” on remote islands.
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premise, learning and readapting is possible. He can influence the process of valuing and its evaluative
results, but he cannot interfere with the ‘blueprint’ that is shared by all human beings. Friday’s innocent
comment about his ignorance in view of cannibalism (“I didn’t know yet that it was wrong” ([2], p. 250)
can be adduced as evidence for this twofold value spectrum Campe introduces and with which he
indeed draws a distinction between cultural manifestion and inherent, i.e., maturationally natural
value: as such the concept of self-defence also formulates an exception from the explicit rules Robinson
knows (for instance, the fifth commandment). It is important that the “savages” are by no means
disqualified by their killing, as Campe recognises that they behave in correspondence with their own
culturally learned practices. As they “only” harm their enemies, Campe also accentuates the relevant
rule which cannot be infringed on: the immorality of harming the “innocent” within a complex moral
accounting scheme of reciprocity which happens to bear on the elaborations on self-defence as well.
Admittedly, this discourse is not Campe’s invention; he models his thoughts on Robinson Crusoe’s
scruples, as longwindedly portrayed by Defoe [25]. As opposed to Defoe, Campe however offers a
confident solution to this inconclusive and arduous examination of conscience by tying the question
of “self-preservation” closely to the educational frame narrative in which the father—in reference to
contemporary law—rationally decides that self-defence constitutes no crime.
In addition to this, Campe’s entelechical concept of humanity historicises the anthropological
concept he espouses with regard to maturational values; by focusing this process on the Western
world he immobilises the dynamic (that he suggests for Robinson within the parameters of the zero
hour narrative) on a historical level and thus caters to both a liberation narrative of the conquistadore
and the highly complacent notion of a “German special path”: “Imperceptibly but all the more
powerfully, Robinson the Younger helped propagate the myth of the benign, efficient, and restrained
German colonizer, a myth that would permeate not just nineteenth-century, but also a good part of
twentieth-century German literature.” ([3], p. 120).
While this aspect proves highly ideological, Campe’s novel indirectly gives an answer to the
question of how other nations can be converted to other cultural practices (in particular if the latter
prove to be more “reasonable”): all human beings are fundamentally the same in view of certain
maturationally natural values (a “family of man”). He shows himself as aware of the—at times
counter-intuitive—complexity of these maturationally natural values and is keen to explore the
origin(s) of and variation in human moral reasoning with a clear focus on “innate” foundations. In the
debate between young Christel and her father about cannibalism Campe consequently differentiates
between cultural values and innate instincts connected with it by proceeding from a widely accepted
moral rule echoing throughout human history: absence of harm:
“Christel. O das hätten sie doch auch wohl wissen können, daß das nicht hübsch sei! Vater. Und
woher, lieber Christel, hätten sie das denn wohl wissen können? Christel. O das weiß ja das kleinste
Kind, daß es nicht recht ist, einen umzubringen, um ihn aufzuessen! Vater. Aber woher weiß denn
dieses das kleinste Kind? Nicht wahr, weil es frühzeitig belehrt worden ist? [...] Vater. Und wenn’s
nun nicht belehrt worden wäre? Wenn sogar seine Eltern und andere erwachsene Menschen, die es
liebte und ehrte, ihm von früher Kindheit an immer vorgesagt hätten, daß es etwas sehr schönes sei,
seine Feinde zu ermorden und aufzuessen? [...] nicht wahr, dan würd’ es wohl schwerlich einem
Kinde jemahls einfallen, das Gegentheil zu vermuthen? Es wurde vielmehr, sobald es groß genug dazu
wäre, mit schlachten und mit verzehren helfen. Und das war der Fall worin diese armen Wilden sich
befanden. Wohl uns, daß Gott uns nicht unter ihnen, sondern von gesitteten Eltern hat lassen geboren
werden, die uns frühzeitig lehrten, was recht und unrecht, was gut und böse sei!” ([2], p. 303).22
22 The English translation curiously replaces young Christel with a male child, Christopher: “Oh, they might very well have
known, that such actions are not good! Father. And how could they have known that, my dear Christopher? Christopher.
Why, the least child knows, that it is not right, to kill and eat people! Father. But whence does the least child know that?
Because it has been told so, is not it true? Christopher. Yes. Father. Now we’ll suppose, it had not been taught so? Suppose,
even its parents and other grown people, whom the child loved and honour’d, had from its infancy always told it, that it
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In contrast to his daughter, the father identifies very general “foundations” of morality. He thus
ensures that the violation of specific rules suggested by Western civilisation does not qualify the
‘savages’ as immoral per se. While Christel indirectly suggests that right and wrong are hard-wired into
everyone’s psyche as a fixed moral premise,23 the father emphasises the role of education and customs,
even when it comes to actually killing and ingesting people. This radical take on learned values
stresses rather than undermines the above mentioned distinction Campe emphatically draws; first of
all, he is keen to underscore that the “savages” “only” kill and eat their enemies (thus still following a
basic norm of moral accounting, albeit within an—according to Campe—false framework of culturally
learned values). Campe acknowledges that there are different moral foundations whose varying
priorities, if colliding, define distinct, cultural approaches. Based on links between evolutionary theory
and anthropological observations Jonathan Haidt arrives at a similar conclusion in view of the political
spectrum nowadays, determining five moral foundations24 on which different political attitudes rely
in different ways, all of which appear in Campe’s Robinson: “care/harm” as a moral foundation (which
“evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children” ([10], p. 178), revolves
around protection and an “innate” aversion towards violence (as Christel explicitely points out).
“Fairness/cheating” ([10], p. 178) presents a response to exploitation, as it provides us with a sense
for persons who prove trustworthy partners for collaboration and reciprocal altruism (as becomes
visible in Friday’s and Robinson’s friendship). “Loyalty/betrayal” which “evolved in response to
the adaptive challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions” ([10], p. 178) is evoked throughout
Campe’s novel as one of the primary values, especially when it comes to parent-child relations. Campe
also addresses the foundation “authority/subversion” ([10], p. 179) in his political reflections (see
above) and of course also in view of filial respect and submission whose violation provides the starting
point for the story in the first place, as Robinson goes to sea against his parents’ better judgement,
thus disrespecting their legitimate authority. Finally “sanctity/degradation” ([10], p. 179)—evolved as
a response to the adaptive challenge of potentially compromised food—is a recurrent proof for the
inferiority of the cannibalistic “savages”.
Although his reflections and descriptions relate to Haidt’s pluralistic scenario, Campe offers a
conclusive hierarchy of these foundations (whose legitimate existence he discerns and accepts) insofar
as he insists that Christian values, as implemented in the eighteenth century, embody a perfected
version of morality. Ultimately, it is this customary (i.e., pedagogically inculcated) viewpoint, a kind of
moral shortcut, that Christel confidently assumes, at first oblivious to the more complex developmental,
moral scenario to which the father has to alert her eventually.
In this particular dialogue he also reiterates one of the uncontested “values” that seem omnipresent
in the novel: the bond between parent and child. For Campe, in his capacity as pedagogue, the
parent-child relation is the vital moral interface. Built on devoted filial trust as the most important
moral reflex, proper values can be learned and developed, i.e., they take on a certain cultural shape.
was something very good, to murder one’s enemies and to eat them? Christopher. Nay then—Father. Then a child would
hardly ever get a contrary idea, is not it true? Such a child would rather, as soon as it was big enough, begin to assist the rest
in killing and eating. And that was the case with these poor savages. Happy for us, that God almighty has not suffer’d
us to be born among them, but of civilized parents, who taught us from our infancy, what is right and wrong, good and
bad!“ ([14], pp. 202–3).
23 This coincides with the resurgence of the idea that men as such possess a moral faculty, as elaborated on by Marc
Hauser: “Moral judgements are mediated by an unconscious process, a hidden moral grammar that evaluates causes and
concequences of our own and other’s actions. [...] I show that by looking at our moral psychology as an instinct—an evolved
capacity of all human minds that unconsciously and automatically generates judgements of right and wrong—that we can
better understand why some of our behaviours and decisions will always be construed as unfair, permissible [...]” ([26], p. 2).
Johnson argues persuasively that it is heuristically not necessary to assume a prexistent moral faculty inherent in humans
that underpins their intuitive judgements. ([20], pp. 137–62).
24 Haidt later also includes the foundation “liberty and oppression” as a likely candidate for the moral foundations, which,
maybe not surprisingly, is missing from Campe’s otherwise comprehensive compilation. Given the utopian context Campe
is more concerned with legitimate authority and illegitimate rebellion (mutiny).
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It is their filial and parental loyalty that stands out as the crucial maturationally natural value in
Campe’s moral universe, as it promises change, development, and perfectibility.
Campe’s stance chimes with the potent concept of education and Bildung in the eighteenth century.
By the same token, this specific scenario admittedly also seems a great concession to the malleability
of human essence and potential in the eighteenth century, as the individual does not command
autonomously over her/his own individuality: Campe concedes that society and its rules assume an
important role in forming a person.
His twofold approach to “values” and the valuing process interestingly appears—despite all
displayed determination to prove the superiority of the West with recourse to reason—indeed to be in
line with the results of Moral Foundation Theory, which also focuses on the phenotypical diversity of
values and the naturally maturational sameness of certain underlying patterns. Moral Foundation
Theory follows Gary Marcus’ specification of innateness in that it acknowledges that “nature bestows
upon the newborn a considerably complex brain, but one that is best seen as prewired—flexible and
subject to change—rather than hardwired, fixed, and immutable.” ([27], p. 12).
In keeping with Marcus’ concept of “innateness”, Moral Foundation Theory emphasises that nature
provides a first draft, which is then revised by experience: “The genes (collectively) write the first
draft into neural tissue, beginning in utero but continuing throughout childhood. Experience (cultural
learning) revises the draft during childhood, and even (to a lesser extent) during adulthood.” ([28], p. 8).
This notion of a first draft and its manifold realisations as a pluralistic take on morality stands out in
Campe’s novel, even though he renders this very notion conspicuously less explosive by integrating it
in the progress achieved by the civilising process,25 simply by providing a clear moral destination in
the present.
While Campe thus assumes a common humanity by “relegating some peoples to the
past moments of a European humanity’s historical becoming” (as Chad Wellmon implies for
Kant ([5], p. 432)), his theories prove to be pertinent to another important aspect of these
anthropological/ethnological/colonial discourses: i.e., the debate around human rights and their
reach which started to unfold around 1800. In a pedagogical manual intended for his daughter
(Paternal Advice for my Daughter, [29]) Campe stresses that she is both human and female, but has
to conform to the limits of the latter definition which he acknowledges to be artificial, i.e., socially
imposed. However, beneath this schizophrenic imposition on female behaviour, it reveals the same
potential for unconditional inclusion,26 as Friday’s fate shows. To Campe women and “savages”
clearly are (or have the potential to be) full-fledged humans in the moral sense and are eligible to
enter the realm where human rights—as envisaged by the eighteenth century—apply: this is one of
the subliminal outcomes of his social experiment which draws so much explicit attention to Western
superiority. In this sense Campe’s novel is not only revealing with regard to the question of concrete
morality; it is also an illuminating attempt to determine the moral rules and properties of humanity
in the eighteenth century, when a clear look at the diversity of different cultures and norms actually
preempted any clarity of such definition.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
25 Campe’s notion of a civilising process indeed reminds the reader of Norbert Elias’ reflections on psychogenesis and
sociogenesis in his eponymous work The Civilising Process (Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation).
26 Campe’s French adaptation of Sophie von La Roche’s Erscheinungen am See Oneida (Appearances at Lake Oneida, 1798) is quite
striking in this context. La Roche’s protagonist Emilie also encounters Natives Americans, ‘savages’, however, “analyzing
her own reaction leads Emilie to empathize with the Native Americans. She sees similarity between their situation and her
own with respect to the obstacles they both face on their path to knowledge.” ([30], p. 122). Campe “deleted La Roche’s
arguments for equal education and her critique of colonial projects” ([30], p. 130). Against this backdrop, Campe’s very
specific conglomerate of progressive educational thoughts and distinct, sometimes conspicuous, sometimes subliminal
disenfranchisement becomes even more tangible.
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